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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

181046

Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy"

constituting gauge invariance

Thomas Ryckman

pp. 279-298

Abstract

The current vogue of naturalism – whether of a pragmatist, instrumentalist or realist variety – in philosophy of physics is largely attributable to a fiction promulgated by logical empiricism, but surviving the latter's demise. It states that relatively theory (especially general relativity) comprised a decisive refutation of Kant, and transcendental idealism more broadly. A closer look at the early years of general relativity reveals a considerably different picture. Here we trace how transcendental idealism informed Weyl's construction of a "purely infinitesimal geometry" whose additional (gauge) degrees of freedom enabled incorporation of electromagnetism into the spacetime metric.

Publication details

Published in:

Bitbol Michel, Kerszberg Pierre, Petitot Jean (2009) Constituting objectivity: transcendental perspectives on modern physics. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 279-298

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9510-8_17

Full citation:

Ryckman Thomas (2009) „Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy": constituting gauge invariance“, In: M. Bitbol, P. Kerszberg & J. Petitot (eds.), Constituting objectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, 279–298.