Conclusion
two basic phenomenological forms of intuitive mental representation
pp. 175-180
Abstract
The main assumption, perhaps, of the present investigation can be put as simply as follows: consciousness matters in mental representation. In this study, I have tried to show exactly how consciousness is involved in any of several more or less elementary varieties of mentally representing something. The reader will have understood that the range of what is referred to by the title of the present study, mental representation and consciousness, has been confined just to intuitive mental representation.
Publication details
Published in:
Marbach Eduard (1993) Mental representation and consciousness: towards a phenomenological theory of representation and reference. Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Pages: 175-180
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2239-1_8
Full citation:
Marbach Eduard (1993) Conclusion: two basic phenomenological forms of intuitive mental representation, In: Mental representation and consciousness, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 175–180.